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1. Introduction 
For a clear overview the first thing that has to be considered is the actual title of the 
presentation. If looked at closely there are four parts that need to be explained.  
“Determining the success of innovative projects: Case Study ‘Project ARA’” 
The title of the project includes the application of major topics such as innovation and 
project management around which this thesis is focused. For analysis ‘Project ARA’, the 
centrepiece of this work, is compared with two successful and two non-successful projects 
in various criteria.  
1.1. Innovation  
Managing innovative projects has played an important role in the past and will be essential 
for developing and introducing new products and processes in the modern economy. 
Innovation describes the process of turning an idea or invention into a service that 
customers will pay for. This must be replicable at an economical cost which should 
eventually become profitable, invoking a buyers’ purchasing power. In order to create 
innovation; information, imagination and initiative are combined in a product. Often these 
concepts are applied to the needs and demands of the customers.1 
There are two types of innovation: evolutionary and revolutionary. Evolutionary innovation 
is the continuous process established through technological advances. Revolutionary 
innovation revolves around the principle that innovation is synonymous with risk-taking. 
When organizations create revolutionary products or technologies they take on a great risk 
because new markets are created.   
1.2. Project management 
Nowadays it has become fairly common to implement project management (PM) processes, 
skills and approaches into the business process. Yet there are still companies that shy away 
from these modern approaches. Often teams headed by senior management staff apply 
antiquated methods in everyday business life. In order to effectively apply PM a company 
has to determine to what lengths it can be applied in the specific situation, which depends 
                                                          
1 (Business Dictionary) 
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on the project size and nature. Overcompensation for small projects will annoy the 
employees and divert from the importance of key control features.2 
Over the last decades3, companies have learned to value project management and see it as 
part of future development. Not only has the application of PM strategies proven useful in 
reducing the investment in potentially failing projects, but the chance to identify possible 
problems early on and solve or monitor them has been created. Besides saving money, PM 
has also helped to improve on-time project delivery while bolstering customer relationships. 
In order to understand the importance of project management the PM triangle, also called 
a triple constraint, needs to be considered. Figure 14 shows the three major constraints of 
managing a project. Time is defined by the timeframe for completion of the respective 
project. The cost factor is determined by the budget that a project has access to. Quality on 
the other hand describes the resulting product standards that are expected or set.5 
When problems arise that threaten one of the three constraints, typically one of them is cut 
down, ideally without disturbing the other limits. So in case the finishing time of the project 
is threatened, the extra cost for organising more material or human resources can be 
considered. If the quality of the project is threatened, a costlier product or service can be 
bought, which might require more time. When determining the success of a project it is vital 
to analyse the difference between the initial constraining factors of the triangle and the 
                                                          
2 (TenStep, 2014) 
3 (Aller, 2015/16) 
4 (Project Management Institute Inc., 2010) 
5 (QTC Control Services) 
Figure 1: The triple constraint triangle, project management of 
time, quality and cost (Projektmanagement Manufaktur) 
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actual values after completion. The smaller the difference, the more efficient management 
methods and the project overall was.  
The main reasons for a project’s success6 are focused around user involvement, executive 
management support and a clear statement of requirements. These three aspects are 
crucial to effectively plan and complete a project. A study states that 15,9% of reasons for 
successes are due to user involvement, 13,9% with executive management support and 
13,0% with a clear statement of requirements. Other factors7 may be linked with the 
involvement of the beneficiary, the support of managers and the overall grasp of 
requirements. Additionally, the expectations towards the project need to be realistic, with 
appropriate planning along the way. 
In order to determine success factors, the main reasons for project failure have to be 
identified. Here the planning and estimation factor, if costs and schedules aren’t revised 
over time can have a grave impact. Furthermore, if the implementation factor, where 
changes in scope, requirements or the project methodology and inspections are executed 
faultily or the human factor is managed with a lack of skill, the failure of the project becomes 
almost certain. The principal factors that contribute to a project’s failure are named poor 
communication, attempting to fulfil unrealistic expectations and lack of resources.   
1.3. ‘Project ARA’ 
‘Project ARA’, which this thesis is centred around, is the R&D and initiation process of 
creating the first mass marketed modular cell phone. By teaming up DARPA employees, 
Google’s advanced technology and knowledge product group and universities, a team of 150 
people worldwide with 20 partners was created.8 The current status is that the product has 
undergone four different stages, the ‘Phonebloks’ concept and the Spiral 1, 2 and 3 
prototypes as of January 2016.  
After only nine months a functioning prototype was created with only a 25% penalty, in 
terms of size, weight and battery life. The initial designer’s, Cave Hakkens,9 idea was 
implemented in the first modular phone of its type. With the goal to create a phone ‘worth 
keeping’ and thereby minimizing the toxic wastes mobile devices produce yearly, this is 
                                                          
6 (Attarzadeh & Ow, 2008, S. 235) 
7 (Toader, Brad, Adamov, Marin, & Moisa, 2010, S. 449-452) 
8 (Eremenko, Project ARA DevCon2 Highlights, 2015) 
9 (Hakkens, Phonebloks - The ultimate phone concept, 12th Sept 2013) 
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considered a huge success. Additionally, the goal of individualization is met, despite the 
disadvantages of a lower battery life and thicker appearance. 
1.4. Introductions to case study work  
In order to collect comparative data, four different case studies were analysed. Two of these 
were successes, namely Nissan Leaf in 2009 and the Apple iPhone in 2007. The Nissan Leaf 
was the first zero-emission, battery powered car to ever enter the market.10 The results were 
impressive, with a market launch about 1,5 years prior to the expected date. The Apple 
iPhone is similar in its success.11 Initiated officially in 2005, based on an entry strategy in 
2004, 200 top engineers were set on the task of creating a functioning device by 2007. Here 
the product was set to be the centrepiece of MacWorld. After a very late breakthrough in 
December 2006, they were able to keep the planned market entry in June 2007.  
Moving on to the failed project cases. For this purpose, the projects SNCF, 2014 and Airbus 
A380, 2006 were chosen.  SNCF, the French railway company initiated a project, where 2000 
new trains should be introduced into the system.12 Due to information loss in the 
communication process the overall result was $68 million more in terms of cost and a two-
year delay.  Since the trains were built too large for the rail width, 1000 station platforms 
had to be adjusted in size. The other failed case was Airbus A380, where a new R&D project, 
featuring a complex wiring system was to be implemented.13 The 16 engineering teams were 
spread over four countries and ended up miscalculating the lengths and amount of material. 
This was mainly due to the fact that they used two different software versions. Overall the 
project took two years longer and cost and additional $6,1 billion. 
2. Overview and purpose 
The aim of this research paper is to create a model for determining the success or failure of 
a project, using previous case studies as comparative data. The initial introduction on the 
methodology and theory will include information on the Classification, Risk analysis 
Performance and Complexity level measurements and the explanation of the comparative 
process.  
                                                          
10 (NISSAN MOTOR CORPORATION, 2009-2013) 
11 (Vogelstein, 2008) 
12 (Callem Consulting LTD, 2015) (Willsher, 2014) 
13 (Callem Consulting LTD, 2009) 
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Figure 214 provides an overview of the general thought process behind this thesis. In the first 
step ‘Project ARA’ will be analysed. This step includes a general introduction of the project, 
after which the project will undergo a general risk analysis. Furthermore, the performance 
and complexity levels will be identified. From this a base, for comparison against the latter 
case studies, is created. 
In the second step there will be an in depth analysis of two successful and two failed projects. 
For each one of them, the described methodologies will aim to classify the projects after a 
short overview of the respective facts and figures. Afterwards all projects will be subject to 
an analysis of performance and complexity levels. The data collected will provide an initial 
perspective on key success drivers that the projects share.  
Thirdly the collected data will be compared. A preliminary standpoint will be taken on if 
‘Project ARA’ is more likely to be successful or fail, according to the previous data. In order 
to harden this standpoint, the performance levels of all cases will be compared, paying 
special attention to the key success drivers. As second contributing factor to determining 
the success or failure of the project the complexity levels will be analysed. From all the 
collected data a graph will be drawn, which will map performance levels against complexity, 
aiming to form a trend line.  
In the final point the data will be summarized, providing an overview of the outcome. From 
this the initial standpoint will be adjusted and any effects that the weaker points have on 
                                                          
14 (Aller, 2015/16) 
Figure 2: Four step model of thesis progress (Aller, 2015/16) 
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the project will be described. Based on these weakness control mechanisms and governance 
factors to prevent potential failure, or support the success will be suggested. 
So overall when viewing this model from the perspective of ‘Project ARA’, Figure 315 should 
provide an overview of the model used to determine the success of failure of a project. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 (Aller, 2015/16) 
Figure 3: Model used to determine the outcome of a project (Aller, 2015/16) 
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3. Methodology 
The methodology applied throughout this work is easiest split into six different steps, as 
shown in Figure 416 that rely on each other. Most typically the project would first be 
preliminarily classified, according to the available data. 
 
This is followed by a closer look of the performance and complexity levels of the project 
itself. Eventually this data is compiled and compared to other case studies. From this 
according to the weaknesses, governance factors will be suggested. 
3.1. Classification of a project 
Projects can be defined as complex, non-routine and one-time efforts.17  They are limited by 
time, budget, resources and performance specifications that are designed to meet customer 
needs.  Managing these projects includes the specific use of a set of tools, techniques and 
knowledge that when applied help to achieve the three main constraints of scope, cost and 
time.  
The latest statistics state that 52,7% of all projects either take longer or cost more than the 
initially projected calculations. Most projects can be classified into three resolution types. 
                                                          
16 (Aller, 2015/16) 
17 (Attarzadeh & Ow, 2008) 
Figure 4: Application of methodology (Aller, 2015/16) 
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‘Type 1’ outlines all successful projects. Characteristics include that they are completed on 
time, within the budget and fulfil all functions and features that were specified. Challenged 
projects are defined as ‘Type 2’. Even though projects are completed, they usually exceed 
the budget or the time frame, offering fewer functions and features than originally specified. 
The third type is defined as impaired projects. These are cancelled at some point during the 
development cycle. 
3.2. Risk analysis 
Risks are real or virtual occurrences that have a negative impact on the duration, the cost or 
the quality of a project or product. Every mathematical risk has a certain amount of chance 
(%) to either occur or not to occur. The goal of a risk analysis is to determine the chance with 
which each risk will occur. This process is bases its calculations on the schedule, goal 
projections and the stakeholder analysis18. Figure 519 depicts this four-step process, which is 
initiated with the risk identification. This continuous on to a throughout assessment of the 
identified risk, which are collected in a risk portfolio or risk log. These risk are then, either 
avoided, reduced, offloaded or accepted as rest risk in the next step of risk control. The final 
step concludes in calculating the damage produced. 
This process of risk management is based on the source (Projektmanagement Manufaktur), 
which inspired Figure 5. Only the most vital parts that could be applied without detailed 
                                                          
18 (Projektmanagement Manufaktur) 
19 (Aller, 2015/16) 
Figure 5: Steps of a risk analysis (Aller, 2015/16) 
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knowledge of the case studies were chosen and assessed according to specific criteria. Based 
on the concepts, further complexity was developed and scaling methods created.  Both 
theory and partial insight from the source were applied in order to build a comprehensive 
method that would support the determination of a project’s outcome by analysing initial 
risks. This will then support the further implemented methodology 
3.2.1. Identification of risks 
The first part of risk management is establishing a risk overview where all potential risks: 
external risks, internal risks, planning risks and risks associated with business, technical and 
environmental issues are categorized. Typically, key team members and stakeholders of the 
project are questioned. This provides a general overview on the most dominant risks. Often 
subject experts are consulted to analyse the current project status to determine the 
potential for future problems and the risks associated with them.  For further insight, the 
quality of data has to be continuously checked and an onsite analysis can provide further 
helpful data.  
One risk group20 is identified as external risks. Here factors such as political regulations and 
interest control the environment and process behind the project. Both sub categories may 
impose severe restrictions on the project. The environmental sub-category includes factors 
such as weather, in terms of possible disadvantages for outside venues or sites and 
economic problems that might impact on transportation, the cost of project or space 
availability. 
 Another risk group is identified as internal risk. This includes the resource application, which 
if done improperly can lead to shortages or resulting costs when miscalculated. Technical 
risks have become increasingly important in modern projects. For example, a lack of 
technical equipment can impact the effectiveness of the team and cause severe delays.  
The third risk group is stated as business risks. Here the skills and work quality of the 
marketing, financing and management team are taken into consideration. If aspects of their 
work, such as the marketing tasks of market research are faulty, the project is deprived of a 
proper approach. If initial data is false, subsequent steps are bound to be faulty. This can be 
seen in financial key tasks such as budgeting, financing and capital investment. If any of the 
                                                          
20 (Projektmanagement Manufaktur) 
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preceding factors are miscalculated the project will either run out of financial resource, or 
undermine their potential if more budget would have been available.  
Another type of risk is the risk associated with planning. The areas scheduling, human 
resource management and quality control are the main focus. Accurate scheduling is 
necessary so that the project is completed in time and tasks that depend on each other are 
executed in a given time frame. The distribution of human resources is also important so 
that the duration, difficulty and skill requirements per tasks are well matched. Quality 
control is perhaps the most important task and helps to guarantee a high quality of any given 
project and meet the stakeholder’s demands.  
The final risk group that has to be considered are the environmental risks. This group is 
usually made of external stakeholders that are interested in protecting animal and 
environmental rights and work in their favour. This can result in protests that may delay the 
scheduling of the project. 
3.2.2. Risk assessment 
Every risk is then logged with a risk score in the portfolio, depending on the effect it will have 
on the project’s outcome. Each logged risk will receive a risk score and undergo the process 
of risk assessment. For this a scale depicted in Figure 621 is generally used. 
The risk assessment team or specialists22 that are well informed on the project usually 
choose the severity of the risk. They should be able to combine current knowledge and past 
knowledge to determine the likelihood of occurrence and the potential impact. The higher 
the risk is labelled the more critical it is to control the problem and find a solution. A high 
                                                          
21 (Projektmanagement Manufaktur) (Aller, 2015/16) 
 
 
Figure 6: Risk assessment, severity spread (Aller, 2015/16) (Projektmanagement Manufaktur) 
18 
 
percentage assigned to a risk identifies with endangering the project’s success, while a low 
assigned percentage normally has minimal impact on the project’s outcome. In order to 
keep track of these various risk groups and potential threats to the project’s success, risk 
logs are filed. 
Figure 723 shows the typical variables a risk log might include. The key components are 
statistics and descriptors of the risk and an analysis of the impact and various prevention or 
alternative methods.  
3.2.3. Controlling risks 
There are four options that management can decide upon once the risks have been 
identified.24 These options are avoiding, reducing, offloading or acceptance of the rest risk. 
Depending on the resulting percentage derived from the risk assessment step the control 
measures vary. Additionally, the main aspects of quality, time and cost are key determining 
factors on the resulting choices. According to this, solution methods to handle the risks are 
initiated in the control process. Often the key term members will provide possible short-
term solutions. 
The first and preferred step is avoiding the risk. All risks are potential candidates for this 
category. If management chooses this option, planning skills have to be very specific and 
additional time is required, so that the critical path of a project is not affected. Choosing this 
option comes with many advantages, the outcome generally doesn’t lack in quality and is 
likely to be completed in time. Here the main focus is on finishing the tasks, while extending 
the planned time, without impacting the overall time frame or critical path. This solely 
means that the earliest starting time of the following tasks is pushed back and the earliest 
finishing time of the problematic task is moved back. Additional costs may result, since the 
                                                          
23 (Projektmanagement Manufaktur) 
24 (Projektmanagement Manufaktur) 
Figure 7: Example of a risk log (Projektmanagement Manufaktur) 
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planned resources assigned to the task are occupied not only for the shortest completion 
time, but also longer. 
If the problem cannot be solved through avoidance the second option comes into play. The 
second option is used when the latest finish time of the problematic task draws critically 
close and the potential of the problem reaching a higher risk level is present. By reassigning 
resources for a certain time period from one task to another, management aims to reduce 
the impact. If additional resources, either in the form of material, human or facilities, need 
to be assigned, the cost is likely to be higher and resources could be diverted from other 
tasks. If resource distribution is not carefully planned and calculated this solution might turn 
into a problem itself. Due to a lack in skilled resources, or slack time to complete the tasks 
the quality of the project might be affected.  
The next level of control is initiated when the risk cannot be reduced using the project’s 
resources. This method of control uses offloading as a solution, where the workload is 
handed off to a third party. Especially in projects that handle sensitive information this 
method can be problematic. Not only does the quality of the project decrease, due to a 
variation in the method of completing the task, but also with different resources the brand 
quality cannot be guaranteed. Additionally, the cost of buying resources, human, machine 
and materials, lowers the budget for other tasks. The time factor is also another 
disadvantage since the time until completion, especially for critical activities is extended and 
the starting point of other activities might be pushed back.  
If none of the previously explored methods can cope as a solution, the impact needs to be 
accepted. This is only done for low risk tasks that do not affect the project’s outcome 
directly. This includes all tasks with a risk score of up to 40%. As long as no other critical tasks 
are affected, the failure of these tasks may reflect a lack of scheduling skill, distribution of 
resources, budgeting or general management flaws. The most dominant impact of this 
method is that resources, money and time will have been spent without any result, resulting 
in the potential lack of the above named for other tasks. 
3.2.4. Calculate damage 
Depending on the method the damage will vary. Avoiding the risk will result in the least 
damage, and accepting the impact in the most damage.25 In this part of the risk analysis, the 
                                                          
25 (Projektmanagement Manufaktur) 
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financial damage of the risk control is calculated and documented in order to convey the 
information to the budgeting and finance team. This could then lead to further control 
measurements in case of budgeting shortages, or in seldom cases the availability of budget 
and resources from cancelled tasks. From this the damage is calculated, which is then passed 
on to management and finance in order to address the project’s budget and resource 
availability and adjust accordingly. 
3.3. Performance monitoring 
Throughout a project, monitoring various management areas can help to identify 
performance levels and discover areas of concern, finding respective solutions in time. 
Figure 826 attempts to scale the various performance levels and provide an overview of 
weaknesses and areas of improvement the project could benefit from if addressed.27 
                                                          
26 (Aller, 2015/16) 
27 (Su, March 27th 2013) 
Figure 8: Project performance example graph (Aller, 2015/16) (Su, March 27th 2013, S. 19) 
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The project performance graph is based on a method commonly used by Deloitte (Su, March 
27th 2013). In their analysis of a project’s performance there are a few more criteria. In 
order to apply this to this bachelor thesis, where exact numbers and figures of detailed 
project knowledge are scarce a few criteria were removed and the criteria ‘marketing 
approach’ was added. Since the initial approach was quite complex, Figure 8 is a shortened 
version that is more effective for these case studies. The following explanation will be a 
mixture between Deloitte’s applied theory and practical methodology and adjustments 
made by the author of this paper.  
The performance level is divided in various performance levels. Everything up to 50% falls 
into the category: ‘of concern’, where work is required and the current management is not 
effective enough. 50 to 75% are underperforming, with more potential to grow. At 75 to 
100% the performance level falls under expected acceptable range for success. 100 to 125% 
show an over performance potential over investment in the specific area. An average line 
will outline the actual performance level average across all categories.  
Risk management focuses on the areas technical risks, the general management of these 
risks. As discussed above the performance level and the monitoring of the success this area 
has is vital in guaranteeing a smooth risk control process. A delay of the project, unexpected 
expenses and a reduced quality, reflect low performance in risk management. Recognizing 
and preventing potential problems can achieve a high performance. With modernization of 
processes technical risks need to be considered especially and addressed directly, so that 
the impact is minimized. Many processes depend on technology and a deficit in this area will 
have drastic results on the success of the project.  
Another area of interest is resource management, which includes skills and experience, 
resource selection and commitment. The careful planning and assigning of resources is 
necessary for processes to be completed in a timely fashion and the respective quality level. 
The amount of resources, human and material has to be available in the right quantities and 
at the right locations. A deficit in either quality or availability can cause a delay on the critical 
path tasks of a project and may cause its failure. Human resources especially have to 
addressed according to skills and experience and have to be available at the right place, in 
the right position and at the right time, in order to reach the maximum performance levels.  
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The third monitored area is ownership, which describes the amount of executive support. 
Here communication between management and executives is crucial to meet the standards 
and goals of a project. Constant updates, information sharing and feedback are a large part 
of creating a project according to stakeholder wants. If criteria set forth by management are 
not met or the client’s wishes are not fulfilled, the relationship and image of the organizers 
is weakened and future clientele might be more suspicious and willing to pay less for the 
services. 
The governance area monitors role and benefits management, the budgets and the 
accountability model.  Depending on the nature of the company and project, extra work or 
special engagement might be rewarded and result in higher motivation levels of the workers. 
Traditionally roles are distributed in a clear organizational chart, but more modern 
approaches split tasks and work titles across disciplines and areas of knowledge, making 
communication more difficult. How this is governed and who holds accountability also 
influences worker’s reactions and engagement. The correct calculation of the budget is vital 
for allowing maximum application to resource usage. Any miscalculations will disrupt the 
workflow and increase the workload for management.  
The next area of focus is delivery management. This includes scheduling, marketing 
approach, design and delivery. If a project follows the timetable, with the parallel scheduling 
plan for resources and tasks the overall execution should proceed smoothly. The success of 
design and delivery are a direct reflection of a successful working process and outcome.  
Both categories are closely linked to resource management and the supply of named 
resources. Finally, the marketing approach, when effective can be a huge support factor for 
the success of a project or product.  
Overall the performance level will provide an overview of the strengths and key drivers of a 
project’s success, but also highlight low performance areas that support failure. By assessing 
the various areas of a project, the many aspects that play into a project’s outcome are taken 
into account. According to the later discussed method, these areas can then be governed, 
through which the average project performance might be increased. 
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3.4. Complexity assessment 
When trying maintaining the quality, timeline and success possibility of a project, the 
complexity of the project can be a determining factor of the amount of control needed. Here 
the theory is taken from Deloitte’s process (Su, March 27th 2013, S. 15). The scoring method 
was developed and interpreted by the author, using a spider diagram model to convey the 
data. The following explanation will again contain a mixture of interpretation and application 
of the initial source in order to derive a method best suited for the case studies in this work.  
There are five factors, identified in Figure 928, which have the most impact on the complexity 
levels. 29Technical, social and contextual complexity, ambiguity and project management are 
the main contributors. The higher the complexity of a project, the higher the level of 
precision, control and feedback in management work and between key decision makers, is 
required. If this is not the case, and the project is handled careless the probability for the 
success of the project decreases drastically.  
Contextual complexity is generally driven by the stakeholder’s actions. More specifically, this 
includes the amount of stakeholder groups and the power that they hold over the projects 
process. If complexity levels are high, which is expressed though a high number of 
                                                          
28 (Aller, 2015/16) 
29 (Su, March 27th 2013) 
Figure 9: Example of spider diagram for complexity assessment (Aller, 2015/16) 
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stakeholder groups, and a lack of independent actions by management, the project can 
suffer immensely. Not only do decisions generally take longer, but a high controlling interest 
can also lead to forced decisions that stakeholders, with low insight into the project 
operations, make, but do not necessarily aid in the project’s success. Here it is important 
that higher management stands in a constant feedback loop with stakeholder, so that new 
concepts and ideas or changes in structure and timeframe of the project can be identified 
early on. This can take weight off the potential negative impacts. 
Another factor, which influences the overall complexity levels of a project, is the technical 
complexity. This is defined as the impact technology has on the infrastructure of the project, 
to what extend technical concepts and features are integrated and how complex data 
systems are. Generally speaking, technology has led to many improvements in terms of 
efficiency levels to document and share information. These issues arise from a lack of 
maintaining the databases and the continuous data entry process. Older generations 
especially face problems comprehending new and complex systems, when compared to 
younger generations that were exposed to similar systems their entire life. Here again 
management needs to carefully that all data is up to date so that potential problems can be 
identified early on. 
Social facts play one of the main roles in the complexity of a project. Here the ability and 
extent of cross discipline familiarity, multi-disciplinary and the levels of change throughout 
the organization are identifying qualities. In this case a broad knowledge can aid in the 
potential replacement of absent key members of a team. Since a project is typically 
restricted in its time frame, the absence of experts can prevent important bottleneck 
activities from being completed. Here it is crucial that team members are trained in a way 
that they become expendable, or replaceable resources if necessary, so the timeline is not 
impaired. High levels of change throughout an organization can create high levels of 
inconsistency and potential stress, therefore it is important that these are minimized and 
employees learn to adapt to constant change and can react in a flexible manner if necessary. 
Human resource planning must address all possible scenarios and anticipate changes, 
absences and necessary additions.  
The ambiguity of a project deals with the uncertainties, assumptions and estimations that 
are made in a project’s plan by management functions. The more speculations and non-
specific measures, facts and durations are used in calculations to determine factors that 
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influence decisions, the higher the complexity of the project is. Straightforward facts and 
true measures and estimations aid in making management decisions on additional 
resources, material or human capacities. With more speculation this process becomes more 
complex and less precise. Therefore, these estimations should be reduced as much as 
possible. With higher risk factors, the complexity of the project increases, because 
preventive measures in case of failure have to be anticipated and a lot more materials have 
to be accessible in a shorter time period. Overall the amount of management control needed 
increased drastically. 
The perhaps largest factor that determines the complexity of a project is the management 
process. Many factors such as the scope of the project structure, the nature of the team, in 
terms of size and experience, the availability of resources and financial expenditure, are 
important in this area. Another aspect is the timeframe and scheduling, which also 
determines the flexibility of a project. The management decisions and methods can 
themselves have a major impact on the overall complexity of the project. If the team is 
unfamiliar with the techniques or the methods aren’t controlled or applied in an orderly 
fashion, the complexity of the project increases. The team’s quality is directly reflected 
through the management and the project itself. The more in tune they are, the smoother 
the work will reach completion. With experience knowledge and possibly a more 
independent working style are developed. An inexperienced team of a larger size will add to 
the complexity of a project, since much more introductory tasks and control over the team 
have to be applied. A similar concept can be applied to the schedule and timeframe. Without 
a clear structure and overview based on careful planning, unnecessary complexity can be 
added.  
As a closing statement it can be said that the many factors that flow into the complexity of 
a project, direct the managerial aspects throughout a project. Therefore, it is vital that they 
are considered when scheduling, planning and completing everyday tasks. Ignorance 
towards the subject matter could have devastating impacts and will generally support 
unrealistic expectations of the team or the project’s outcome and completion time, quality 
and cost. 
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3.5. Comparative calculations 
The final step of determining the success or failure of a project comes down to comparing 
case study data. Even though the four projects analysed in this thesis only give a limited 
argumentation point, a basic point of comparison will be created. This will provide key 
indicators for the direction a project is most likely to take, success or failure. Three levels of 
  qqâ1ycomparison will be applied: comparing the performance levels, comparing the 
various areas of complexity and the overall complexity and finally graphing performance 
against complexity. 
3.5.1. Performance level comparison 
The first comparative measure is the average performance of the individual projects 
graphed in a bar chart as portrayed in Figure 10.30 The author developed this measures as a 
mean of comparing the case studies and determine indication factors of a project’s 
outcome. 
The goal is to find similar and contradicting data between the successful and the failed 
projects. From this it will then be easier to determine how the performance percentage of 
‘Project ARA’ lies, and how this could predict the outcome. 
After the average performance has been compared, the comparison will go into further 
detail, comparing ‘Project ARA’ data to the successful case study data and the failed case 
                                                          
30 (Aller, 2015/16) 
Figure 10: Example of bar chart for graphing the average project performance (Aller, 2015/16) 
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study data separately. This will help find similarities in the criteria that might indicate the 
success or failure of ‘Project ARA’.  
These could be considered determinants that might be decisive and can provide data for 
governance factors for management. Figure 1131 shows a method commonly applied by 
Deloitte when assessing a project’s outcome. Depending on how many characteristics are 
shared with the successful or failed projects, the outcome of the project can become even 
clearer. The comparison of the project’s percentages by criteria was undertaken in the 
comparative part. Comparing each criterion individually gives an indication of criteria’s 
indicating success and those reflecting failure. 
 
 
 
                                                          
31 (Su, March 27th 2013) 
Figure 11: Example of project performance comparison (Su, March 27th 2013, S. 22) 
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3.5.2. Complexity level comparison 
The next method compares the complexity levels of the project, scrutinizing each individual 
factor that can contribute to the overall level of complexity. Figure 1232, gives an indication 
of the final graph. This was developed by the author, combining both the total complexity 
score and the score in each criterion. Again similarities and differences can be drawn from 
the graph, predicting success or failing determinations.  
 
Not only does it allow the observer to gain insight into the five categories, but also the overall 
score. From this the most complex areas that require the most amount of managerial control 
can be identified. If projects share similar complexity levels, the outcomes or at least the 
general process will overlap. This will provide an estimate of the overall outcome of the 
project. 
                                                          
32 (Aller, 2015/16) 
Figure 12: Example of a bar chart, graphing the complexity comparatively (Aller, 
2015/16) 
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3.5.3.  Performance against complexity – Graph  
In the last comparative method, the average performance levels will be graphed against the 
complexity levels. This data will be graphed on a scatter plot graph, from which an 
approximate trend line can be drawn. Ideally, with more comparative projects this could 
look like the Deloitte example in Figure 1333. The comparative approach to determining 
project outcome commonly applied by Deloitte has been copied with a slight alterations and 
the problem of only possessing five points of data. Through the plotting a complexity against 
performance criteria, it is made possible to determine the performance required at a certain 
complexity. Additionally, it can therefore predict whether performance levels of a project 
are high enough for the existing complexity and what performance levels were required.  
The calculated trend line, which will be inaccurate due to the only four existing points for 
comparison, the final project will be plotted. Depending on the coordinates the similarities 
to the case study outcomes can be determined. By following general indicators of the trend 
line, analytical conclusions can be drawn providing an approximation of the project 
outcome.  
                                                          
33 (Su, March 27th 2013) 
Figure 13: Scatter plot graph, x-complexity score against y-performance % (Su, March 27th 2013, 
S. 22) 
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The conclusion is based on all comparative measures, and will try to pinpoint the areas that 
are crucial for the success of a project, or what scenarios are most plausible. 
3.6. Governance factors 
The main areas that governance factors are applied to are resource and delivery 
management, ownership, governance, contracting and the business unit itself. In order to 
pre-vent projects from failing over time many preventative methods have been developed. 
In every project key governance groups provide additional support. Monitoring of a 
company’s internal and external activities and the risks associated with them is done 
through various key governance support groups, indicated in Figure 14.34 
 
The internal audit is part of the first monitoring group, where key risks the company faces 
are identified and corresponding solutions or prevention methods are identified.35 The main 
goal is to guarantee the organisation’s objectives. While the internal audit looks at both 
financial and non-financial aspects, the external audit analyses only the financial side. The 
annual review of financial accounts and internal financial control methods pro-vide an 
                                                          
34 (Su, March 27th 2013) 
35 (Turnkey Consulting) 
Figure 14: Governance factors in business (Su, March 27th 2013) 
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estimate of the company’s financial position. The collected data is then presented through 
the audit committee, which relies on its independence from management control.36 
The next area of control is risk management, where risks are first identified, analysed, 
assessed and then either avoided, reduced, offloaded or accepted as rest risk.37 Project 
management, which is defined as the application of knowledge, skills, tools, and techniques 
to activities in order to meet certain requirements. This becomes another vital monitoring 
source.38 
The third governance support group consists of senior management and the board of di-
rectors. The senior management, typically appointed by the board of directors, actively 
participates in the daily supervision, planning and administrative processes, with the 
objective of reaching company goals.39 Above the senior management, the elected board of 
directors operates mainly representing the stockholders, establishing corporate policies and 
deciding on major company issues.40  
Through governments and other regulators, another monitoring group is added to the 
progress of a project. This is normally expressed through corporate laws, taxes and other 
laws that influence the way that a business can operate.41 Program governance on the other 
hand ensures an alignment between business strategy and the goals throughout a program’s 
life cycle.42  
The referenced key governance factors control much of the process surrounding a project 
and the actions of the company. Not only does the financial and non-financial data of the 
organization provide insight into the company’s power and possibilities, but also helps 
recognize key risks and helps prevent them. Furthermore, the daily processes are planned 
and supervised and solutions for company issues are outlined. The actions are further 
controlled through government and official regulations. Each group will limit or improve the 
quality of everyday tasks. 
 
                                                          
36 (Financial Times) 
37 (Business Dictionary) 
38 (Project Management Institute Inc., 2010) 
39 (Business Dictionary) 
40 (Investopedia) 
41 (Cambridge Business English Dictionary) 
42 (Hanford, 2005) 
32 
 
4. ‘Project ARA’ 
For the analysis of ‘Project ARA’ there are four steps that will be followed. To provide an 
outline of the facts and figures of the project, the development of the project, the current 
status of the team, the general goal and the disadvantages will be described in the 
introduction. This is followed by the identification of potential risks associated with the 
project, their assessment and the control measures. After this the performance and 
complexity levels are assessed.  
4.1. Introduction 
‘Project ARA’ is based on the modular phone concept by the Dutch Designer Cave Hakkens. 
In a YouTube video43 that went viral on the 10th September 2013 he first introduced this 
idea. He imagined the collaborative work of scientists, developers and companies via an 
open platform to create a ‘phone worth keeping’. 
 From this ‘Phonebloks’44 was introduced as a solution to the continuously increasing 
amount of electronic waste we produce, to which phones are one of the biggest 
contributors. Every time one component of the smartphone malfunctions or becomes out-
dated, it is thrown away, even if the rest of the phone is still operable. Companies do not 
strive to create long lasting electronics or produce little waste material; their focus lies in 
high profits, without taking the resulting consequences into consideration. Hakkens wanted 
                                                          
43 (Hakkens, Phonebloks - The ultimate phone concept, 12th Sept 2013) 
44 (Hakkens, Phonebloks, 2013) 
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to reduce this excess waste, by creating a phone that was put together with interchangeable 
blocks. This meant that one block could easily be replaced if it malfunctioned or became out-
dated. All blocks would be connected to a base by pins that could transfer signals; two 
screws would then hold all parts in place. Through this the customer would be provided with 
the option of customizing their phone. Not only would the brand be variable, but also the 
quality and type of feature, such as better cameras or longer lasting batteries. 
4.1.1. Facts and figures – ‘Project ARA’ 
45Based on this concept in November 2013 a research team was 
formed. This combined DARPA workers that pursue futuristic projects 
and Google’s advanced technology & knowledge product group.46 The 
final team consists of 20 partners, and ads up to 150 people.47 In 
collaboration with universities across the globe a nonlinear working 
style was adapted through which interdisciplinary work with cooperate 
trade-offs and cooperative efforts were possible. This small team used 
basic scientific and technical understanding and new physic discoveries 
and technology to develop a modular phone.  
After team ARA developed the endoskeletal hardware, developers were attracted to create 
basic modules, which is an essential step for the following project steps. Distributing the 
MDK, the module developer’s kit48, which contained: design specifications, open source 
firm- and hardware, a set of designed electrical and mechanical cap modules, became the 
first step of marketing. These kits enabled partners to develop modules from scratch, and 
either utilize contract manufacturing and module design services to complete their 
concepts, or create their own modules. Additionally, several 100 sets of developer hardware 
or death boards were loaned out so that the creation of prototypes and the testing of 
modules would be more efficient and affordable for smaller partners.  
In order to test the consumer reaction to this product, Puerto Rico was chosen as a pilot 
market.49 With about 3 million in population, this country accommodates a very diverse 
mobile user base, form entry-level feature phones to premium smart phones. This reflects 
                                                          
45 (Project ARA) 
46 (The Verge, 2014) 
47 (Eremenko, Google's Project Ara Prototype Demo, 2015) 
48 (Project ARA) (Eremenko, Project ARA DevCon2 Highlights, 2015) 
49 (Eremenko, Project ARA DevCon2 Highlights, 2015) 
Figure 15: 'Project 
ARA' logo (Project 
ARA) 
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the respective global market shares: 1,5 billion smart phone and 5 billion feature phone 
users. Puerto Ricans are veracious mobile users: ¾ of all Internet access is conducted with 
mobile devices, reflecting a global trend.  Field experimentation and analyses were 
implemented, resulting in case-specific information and feedback that would shape the 
product according to the needs of the community. The University of Puerto Rico, including 
all eleven campuses, posed as a controlled environment for research. They later become a 
member of the multi university research agreement, MURA. 
Puerto Rico is in American territory and under FCC jurisdiction50, allowing a regulatory 
approach for certifying ARA. This provides an advantage to speed up the product launch 
since political and legal discrepancies are limited. Being a designated free trade zone, the 
import of modules from developers worldwide was an easy task as well.  
Part of ‘Project ARA’ was the implementation of a logistic infrastructure, needed to receive 
endoskeletons, shells and modules from platform partners. Aspects such as the 
maintenance of the inventory, the construction of additional manufacturing plants for the 
decoration of shells, via a di-supplementation process, and the specific customer packaging. 
Furthermore, the transportation means for packaging and shipping to customers and retail 
points, had to be arranged. The trucks are designed to provide constant feedback of their 
routes, in order to tailor the pilot project according to additional requirements and collect 
marketing information on less profitable areas.  
Through a close collaboration with the distributive carries Open Mobile and Claro Puerto 
Rico, a tailored carrier acceptance protocol for ARA cellular modules and devices can be 
created. Additionally, joint retail opportunities and the development of a service module for 
the ARA market pilot are being explored. 
4.1.2. Goals and disadvantages  
The general goal of ‘Project ARA’ is to develop awareness to the environment, creating a 
more sustainable solution to constant updates in technology and the massive amounts of 
toxic wastes produced from cell phones.51 By developing interchangeable modules, broken 
or out-dated parts can easily be replaced. Apart from being more environmentally friendly, 
the concept of individualization52 can be pursued. Modular phones can be created according 
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51 (Hakkens, Phonebloks - The ultimate phone concept, 12th Sept 2013) 
52 (Eremenko, Project ARA DevCon2 Highlights, 2015) 
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to the individual’s preferences. Each module can be chosen by brand, price and quality level. 
Even the shell casing can bare individualized pictures or designs.  
Cell phones traditionally attempt to cover all features on one single circuit board or single 
chip, reducing the space and the components in this space. Modular phones on the other 
hand pull apart these features and place them on individual modules, rather promoting 
quality over quantity.53 Even though this has a lot of benefits, it also comes with an 
enormous disadvantage, a generally thicker appearance and an increase in battery 
exhaustion.  
This disadvantage is reduced to a penalty of ¼ in comparison with current smart phones. 
Consumers have to choose whether they are willing to trade individuality, flexibility and a 
more environmentally friendly position for the penalty of a thicker, less long lasting phone. 
The project sets completely new standards on how phones will evolve and how production 
and purchase will change in the future. 
4.1.3.  Development process 
The latest version: Spiral 3, has undergone three development stages so far. The ‘Phoneblok’ 
concept was transformed into the prototype Spiral 1 version and then into the Spiral 2 
model. The basic concept is an endoskeleton Figure 1654 over which data between the 
attached modules is processed and transferred. 
                                                          
53 (The Verge, 2014) 
54 (Ara Endo (Medium Variant)) 
Figure 16: ARA Endoskeleton and structural components (Ara Endo (Medium Variant)) 
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On both sides of the endo-ribs, slots for the display and other modules are placed. Through 
next generation networking technology these interface blocks, more specifically pads and 
wireless capacitive pads, can be enabled. The high-speed interface technology runs on grey 
bus software, which supports a fast transfer of data between the modules. Electro 
permanent magnets are in control of holding the modules is place.55 These are a cross 
between permanent and electro magnets, meaning they reside in an on and off state. 
Electrical pulses facilitate the regulation between the two states, allowing for hot swapping 
of modules without consuming any power. Hot swapping is the process of removing a model 
and replacing it with another, while leaving the device turned on. The new module with all 
its functions can be recognized after 10 seconds, ready for usage.  
Proceeding to the modules that can be inserted into the endoskeleton. Various types include 
processors, speakers and batteries. The shells materials are moulded polycarbonates with a 
pebble like, waterproof exterior. The current software that the modules are compatible with 
is Android. For a more individualized shell, 3D printing of customized designs on the exterior 
is in a planning phase.56 
4.1.3.1. Spiral 1 
In June 2014 the Spiral 1 prototype57 was presented, disproving the common concept that 
modular phones were impossible to produce. The application of the Moore’s law, the slight 
change of the electro mechanical components and the application of a modern data 
protocol overcame major problems. The penalty on modularity was reduced to 25%, 
balancing the aspects of size, weight and power consumption, while supporting modularized 
features.  
After only nine months after the implementation of ‘Project ARA’, the prototype was 
functional despite running over a laboratory bench. In this stage the main constricting 
features were resolved through implementing packet switch networks on the device. The 
industry standard Mipi UniPro protocol applies a flexible power bust, which allows the 
module to become a power source, power synch or power storage device. This is the 
technology necessary for hot swapping the battery and modules. 
                                                          
55 (The Verge, 2014) 
56 (The Verge, 2014) 
57 (Eremenko, Google's Project Ara Prototype Demo, 2015) 
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At this stage58, the creation of a supply chain for EPMs, electro permanent magnets, the 
process for the shell fabrication and the UniPro A6 are the main concern. ‘Project ARA’ 
claims, that by fall 2014, an android version that supports modularity will be ready to run on 
the software. 
4.1.3.2. Spiral 2 
In February 2015 the Spiral 2 Demo was introduced to the public.59 This model uses a first 
generation UniPro Bridge and A6 switches that help communication between the AP and 
the display.60 The shells are moulded polycarbonates with di-sublimations. The connector 
blocks embedded in the endo underwent a redesign switching to electro permanent 
magnets on both the front and the back. 
Prototype modules such as a receiver module with an earpiece, audio and proximity sensor, 
a camera model with a higher megapixel camera, a Wi-Fi and Bluetooth module with 
integrated antenna and a display with attached volume and power buttons were designed. 
Others such as a band five antenna for 3G cellular receiver, and application processor based 
on marble chips, speaker and battery modules were also created for this version to give a 
perspective of ‘Project ARA’’s future.  
In this stage, MDKs or module developer kits have been uploaded online, for potential 
producers of modules. In order to support this trend, more than 200 sets of developer 
hardware or death boards are loaned, in order to guide the creation and testing of 
prototypes.61 
4.1.3.3. Spiral 3 
With the introduction of the Spiral 3 prototype, multiple improvements to the Spiral 2 model 
were realized.62 One new feature was changing the DC coupled data running over spring 
pins to AC coupled inductive pads between the endoskeleton and the modules. These 
inductive pads are contactless and have an air gap of 150 microns, which reduces the 
scratching produced from the older model’s spring pins.  
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59 (Desi Tribe, 2015) 
60 (Fishman, 2015) 
61 (Eremenko, Project ARA DevCon2 Highlights, 2015) 
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Not only was the type of connection to the modules improved, but also its sturdiness, now 
being much more susceptible to heavy use or pressure. In the new design of the electro 
permanent magnets, they are embedded in the device’s rear modules. The modules will 
allow double branding between ‘Project ARA’ and the brand of the modules. 
4.2. Risk analysis 
In order to complete a risk analysis on ‘Project ARA’ the Figure 5, Page16 model will be 
applied. For this the potential risks will have to be identified. The five groups63, also identified 
earlier are external and internal risks, business risks, planning risks and the associated 
environmental risks.  
The first risk group consists of all external risks. One of the impacts of political regulations 
could affect the later stages of the project, especially transportation, the establishment of 
storage facilities, manufacturing plants and the surrounding infrastructure to supply the 
product. With numerous restrictions solutions have to be found and the overall time will 
increase. Depending on the safety and construction rules, the calculated budget might have 
to be increased. Another external impact might be space availability in larger cities, when 
the product market is expanded to developed regions. Building a new manufacturing plant 
near a city or housing will be problematic and might lead to additional noise and pollution 
fees. Since the product is not ethically or otherwise negatively implicated, political 
restrictions might favour local producers more, but will not restrict the production or 
distribution of the product itself.  
Internal risks are another group that one needs to assess, for optimal control of the project. 
This implicates the distribution of resources, more specifically material and human 
capacities. Since the team structure is extremely complex, the scheduling has to be on point. 
The potential risks include low effectiveness, if not all 150 team members are assigned 
specific tasks. The dependence on technical equipment is extremely high in this case, and 
any malfunctions or shortages could lead to immense delays. In this case one would have to 
plan for extra resources and financial support.  
The third risk group, business risks, is reflected in the overall skills and expertise of the team. 
Here the sectors marketing, finance and management play a major role. In this case the skill 
level is very mixed, since professionals with extensive experience and universities with less 
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experience and knowledgeable are included. Despite the fact that the more difficult 
engineering tasks and the final projections and choices are left to the experts, preliminary 
data has a high potential to be faulty. The risk is rooted in the initial data’s accuracy, since 
subsequent steps have a high likelihood of being flawed.  
Further risk factors come from planning. Scheduling, HRM and quality control, similar to the 
internal risks account for the potential risks. If too many tasks, or a too high workload is 
handed to an individual or given within a certain time frame, the possibility of it affecting 
and delaying other tasks is very high. This may lead to increased costs, if scheduling and 
human resources don’t match up. Additional to the cost factor, the quality of the product 
might also suffer, if the planned time is too short.  
The last potential risk group stems from environmental risks. In this case this risks are 
relatively low, since neither animal rights nor environmental rights are harmed. A point 
where this could become a problem, is when manufacturing plants at the latter stages of 
the project are being planned and built. In order to not delay the market entry and loose 
valuable production time, the potential risks need to be considered.  
From this the following table was created, showcasing the level of risk, and the strategy to 
deal with them and the potential impacts. 
Table 1: Risk analysis of 'Project ARA' (Aller, 2015/16) 
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Table 164 gives an indication of the severity of risk factors associated with the project’s 
success. As previously stated the level of risk determines the amount of managerial control 
necessary for each part of the risks. 
To summarize the most dangerous risk in this project that falls into the category ‘extremely 
critical’ is risk no.7, the task scheduling. Since this project deals with a very complex team, a 
risk level of 80-100% reflects how vital it is for management to control the 150 official 
members, split between 20 partners. If some tasks lack the amount of human or material 
resources with the right qualifications, the schedule and completion date are endangered. 
If this is not monitored closely, the success of the project is threatened. Control measures 
for this include reducing the risk, by reassigning or increasing the number of available 
resources usually using the slack time assigned to a task. If this is not enough, tasks such as 
marketing research can be outsourced, by offloading the problem to a third party. The 
impact this category has on time can be severe, and can increase the costs through added 
resources. Additionally, outsourcing tasks can reduce the level of quality.  
The next risk level is between 60-80%; any risk is considered critical and will have a 
noticeable impact on the success of the project. The risks that fall into this category are 
number 4, 5 and 6. The internal risks include effective scheduling and the problems 
associated with technical equipment. Effective scheduling includes assigning tasks, so that 
one individual has a manageable workload, with enough time for completion, and possible 
slack time.  The technical equipment carries such a high importance, since a shortage or 
breakage of machinery will have immense impacts on the overall timeline of the project and 
in case of risk reduction or offloading will additionally drive up the cost. The third risk in this 
level is the skills and expertise the staff possesses. Despite the many experts working on 
‘ARA’, there are also many groups that have less experience and knowledge, such as the 
universities. If in this case false or inaccurate data is provided by these parties and it would 
be used without double-checking, the quality of marketing application, product realization 
and many logistical aspects that rely on the gathered data would be of very low quality. The 
only measure that can again be applied is reduction of offloading.  
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Another risk level includes risk estimated at 40-60%, which are partially critical. ‘Project ARA’ 
expresses these in through the risks, number 2 and 4. The more critical is the effective 
scheduling as an internal risk which links to the previously stated number 7, which falls into 
the level extremely critical. This risk is associated with the exact scheduling of resources, 
material and human, with the right skills, at the right time and in the right quantity. This risk 
can be dealt with by offloading or reducing and will most likely have a negative impact on 
the cost and time of the project. The other risk that falls into this level is the external risk 
associated with the space availability from a logistical standpoint. Here the consequences 
have to be accepted and are most likely to result in higher costs.  
The second lowest risk level includes estimates from 20-40% and indicates a low risk level. 
The two identified risks from ‘Project ARA’ are number 1 and 8 from Figure X. The first risk 
is an external risk and includes certain regulations imposed by the government on 
infrastructure, transport, manufacturing plants or storage units. In terms of political 
restrictions there is very little that can be done, the application all required permits and 
licenses will potentially impact the time most. Number 8 is an environmental risk that could 
result from the risks based on the manufacturing plant or any other large, loud and 
potentially polluting set-up associated with ‘Project ARA’. In this case the potential impact 
has to be planned for and included in the research and execution of logistical tasks. If this is 
not done to the fullest, protests or legal restrictions will most probably delay the project and 
therefore directly impact the overall cost.  
The lowest risk group that indicates a very low risk and minimal impact on the project ranges 
from 0 to 20%. This only includes one risk factor, number 3, an external risk depicted through 
the political favouritism and support of local businesses, either supported by laws or actions 
taken. In this case ‘Project ARA’ will have to accept the consequences and plan for a potential 
increase in costs due to higher prices for property, ground or additional fees that might arise.  
Overall this results in a list of areas that require special monitoring support, especially in the 
higher risk categories of 60% upwards. This does not mean that the lower categories can be 
neglected but rather that due to their smaller impact on the overall project they are of less 
importance than the more critical risks, that require more attention. 
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4.3. Performance monitoring 
The project performance tells a lot about the success of applying management control 
towards optimizing the process towards completion. This is summarized in the Appendix 9: 
Project performance level: ‘Project ARA’.65 
 The most problematic criteria are the performance levels that have levels of about 50%. For 
‘Project ARA’ this includes role management, cost projections, delivery and scheduling. Role 
management levels are so meagre, due to very non-standardized roles. The amount of 
managers and levels are so plentiful due to the overall large team size. Furthermore, the 
development process has already been more extensive, impacting the market entry date 
and lowering the cost projection performance. This is linked with the delivery and scheduling 
tasks that are also low in performance. Even though the R&D progress is in its final steps, 
the infrastructure is still behind scheduling.  
The areas with slight underperformance are centred on the management skills, more 
specifically the executive support and stakeholder management. Despite some executive 
control being present, the problem with the work conducted during the project and the 
teamwork is noticeable. Stakeholder management does not reflect a high performance, 
since the deadline of the project and market entry keeps getting pushed, defying set goals. 
Linked to this is the performance of the team, in terms of skills and experience. Since the 
involvement of universities is rather high, the quality and time might be impacted since top-
level performance cannot be reached. Despite having some highly qualified researchers, 
many inexperienced members ultimately lower the performance level. From this the 
marketing approach can be derived which takes longer the usual and is based on a lot of 
control work. The resource selection is impacted since most material orders are specialised 
and do not follow standard construction and manufacturing sources. The resource 
commitment has a higher performance level at 100%, with steady supply of shipped and 
ordered goods.  
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The peak performances of ‘Project ARA’ with slight over performance are in the standardized 
categories: accountability, budgeting and benefits management. Since these are common 
tasks that follow standard procedures the performance is on point. More specifically ‘Project 
ARA’ excels in the category design, which has come a long way from the initial conceptual 
design idea and exceeded all expectations. The risk levels, management and technical risks 
are extremely high in this project. Management risks are linked to the large responsibility 
and complexity that comes with organizing such a large, spread out team, that partially has 
very little practical experience. The technical risks on the other hand are accompanied by 
the complexity that comes with new inventions and R&D projects. 
 
These numbers were then graphed in Graph 166. The dark line at 87,5 % indicates the average 
performance. Since this is a relatively high performance, the success cannot be guaranteed, 
                                                          
66 (Aller, 2015/16) 
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but rather depends on how the lower performing factors are handled. These are mainly 
bringing the project to the market fast and swiftly so that the performance of scheduling 
and delivery is raised and cost projections can be determined more accurately. By improving 
the lower performance levels, the difference between success and failure can be decided. 
4.4. Complexity comparison 
For further insight into the managerial control needed, the complexity of a project can be a 
decisive factor. Table 267 provides an overview of the scores in complexity throughout 
various criteria. 
*Extensive version: Appendix 10: Level of complexity: 'Project ARA'  
For ‘Project ARA’ the contextual complexity is fairly high, scoring three out of four. The 
power that the stakeholder has over the project, rather than the amount of stakeholders, 
reduces the level of independence ‘Project ARA’ has and drives complexity. Since the project 
was initiated through Google, their interest is the main concern throughout the project.  
The next complexity factor is social facts, scoring a high of four out of four. This high 
complexity is calculated from the numerous multi-disciplinary and cross-disciplinary 
interactions in this project. There is a high amount of communication need between the 
teams worldwide, which is made difficult by the fact that the teams are very mixed in skill 
level, spread across locations and the general fields of expertise. This will require strong 
control and monitoring skills to manage. 
The third factor: ambiguity lays at a mediocre two out of four points. The R&D nature of the 
project, as well as some level of uncertainty and assumptions when it comes to the 
timeframe of the project drives the complexity. Both of these aspects will need to be 
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considered when planning the project, keeping in mind that they could develop into 
potential threats.  
Project management complexity is also at a mediocre level; with the root causes derived 
from the large team size and partially the lacking experience some of the team members 
have. Additional to this, there are some limitations to the flexibility of the workload, since 
the experts on the product cannot be replaced easily. The timeframe is also limiting and is 
dealt with by beneficial application of human resources. 
The last and most complex criterion is the technical complexity of the project. Both the 
dependence on technology and its integration into the infrastructure, in form of databases 
and machines, is extremely high. This can turn into a high risk factor and has to be considered 
for the assignment of resources and when planning the schedule. 
 
From the previous analysis Graph 268 was drawn. This spider net graph shows that the 
technical complexity and that arising through social factors are extremely high. For 
management it is vital to pay special attention to these areas when proceeding 
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5. Case study 
A project can be discussed from two angles: the objective and the subjective side.69 
Subjective measurements are always influenced by the individual’s opinion and 
interpretation of the situation. Even if a scale is used, the exact difference in rank is decided 
by the judge, and can vary depending on who is in charge of judging. An objective approach 
on the other hand allows specific values for comparison that are without bias or prejudice.  
These cases have been judged as objectively as possible, using the same scaling criteria on 
every factor. At the end of the line it is impossible to be completely withdrawn. This will 
justify he subjective disadvantage the project holds, due to a personal standpoint that 
cannot be negated.  
For each project the above steps will be applied. Initially each project will be introduced and 
then classified according to the previous methodology. Here the three options are ‘Type 1’ 
to ‘Type 3’, ranging from successful, over challenged, to impaired. After this the 
performance levels and complexity levels will be scrutinized. 
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6. Electric car: Nissan Leaf, 2009 
2009 Nissan signed various zero-emission contracts with countries and conducted research 
on possible technologies and the application of this knowledge to construct an 
environmental friendly vehicle.70  In 2010 Nissan signed an agreement with Lease Plan to 
design the first fully electric car. This project was planned to launch in 2011 and mass-market 
globally from 2012 onwards. The goal was to design a zero-emission battery-powered car. 
Part of the distribution plan ran over Lease Plan, who provided the established customer 
market. Due to pre-developed technology and research the first inverter was constructed 
by August 2010. The first motor and complete Nissan Leaf, the first mass-produced 100% 
electric vehicle, rolled from the line by October 2010 and was then introduced into the U.S. 
and Japan by December.71 
6.1. Classification 
The Nissan Leaf project outlines a project that falls into ‘Type 1’, a successful project. Not 
only was the resulting product ready in time, or in this case ahead of time, but the quality 
was as promised. The goals of the initial concept have been met. According to sources the 
only aspect that suffered was the cost area. Originally the motor cost had been estimated 
at around $9000, but latest numbers indicated prices as high as $18.000.72 
6.2. Performance 
When assessing the project’s success in managing various areas of concern Appendix 1: 
Project performance: Project Nissan Leaf gives an indication of the results. With this project 
there were many standardized tasks, since the development of a new motor is relatively 
normal for a car company. Resources, human and machine bases are part of an existing R&D 
department that is skilled in working together collaboratively. Management positions are 
used for handling the development of innovative products and the environment at hand. 
There are no real restrictions on the budget, since additional financial aid can be granted 
relatively easy. In this project the scheduling was impeccable, with the desired end result 
completed ahead of time with an intact and working design. The delivery and marketing 
approach are, in this case, also standardized processes. 
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Some factors on the other hand that reflect a bad managerial control are technical risks that 
were initially present. The nature of the product was innovative and had never been 
completed before. This meant that provided research had to be efficient enough to sustain 
the development process and allow the eventual design of a zero-emission motor. Even 
though the skills and experience of R&D experts were extensive, the risk associated with this 
innovation still posed some potential problems. Especially for the motor material, new 
suppliers might have had an impact on the delivery speed and the cost. In terms of cost 
projections for the actual project, the estimate turned out to be very inaccurate. Not only 
did the motor itself end up at more than double the price, but due to profit margins the final 
price was increased as well.  
From the above data the following  Graph 373 was established: 
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Indicated by the dark line is the average performance level at 92,12%. This shows that even 
though the project was an overall success, the performance level especially in the areas of 
cost projections, management risks and the high technical risks associated with the project, 
were not at a high performance level. Other areas such as the delivery, scheduling, role 
management, budgets and resource commitment on the other hand, showed over 
performance and can be counted as key success factors.   
6.3. Complexity 
When trying to determine the outcome of a project, the level of complexity plays an 
enormous role. The higher the complexity of a project, the harder it is to manage and control 
the results. Table 374 shows a summary of the level of complexity. 
*Extensive version: Appendix 2: Level of complexity: Project Nissan Leaf 
The contextual complexity is placed at a three out of four. This is moderately high and can 
be attributed to the number of stakeholders, in this case Lease Plan. Despite having a low 
number of stakeholders, the actual level of control over the project this stakeholder has is 
extremely high. This is due to an interest in the success of the project and a stake in potential 
profits. An increase in communication between management and the stakeholder parties is 
necessary to form a feedback loop for sharing information and fulfilling the requests and 
concerns that might come up.  
The next possible factor for adding complexity to a project is social factors. In this case the 
communication between disciplines and the amount of collaborative work is relatively low. 
Being a standardized project the work is secluded in the respective sectors. The 
communication is processed and controlled by the management. With a labelling of one out 
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of four the complexity is at a minimum and does not impact the amount of managerial 
control required.  
The third area is ambiguity, which is determined by cost estimation, the uncertainty, 
assumptions and risks associated with the project. Project Nissan scored at a three out of 
four, which makes it another factor of complexity. Designing and developing a new type of 
motor comes with high risk and uncertainty. The success is never assured and drives the 
need for control. Another factor involved is cost estimation, a change in the budget. Since 
the motor costs were projected below the actual outcome, the budget had to be expanded 
adding to the complexity of the project. 
Technical complexity75 can be attributed to the dependence on the technology when 
developing a new product. The infrastructure has a relatively low dependence on 
technology, without any overly complex databases of programs. Most technical calculations 
are done with field-tested programs and calculation that the team is comfortable with using. 
The project’s dependence on new technical developments on the other hand is higher. 
Without the necessary functions the product’s success is not guaranteed. With a score of 
three out of four this is one of the main contributors to complexity. 
                                                          
75 (Aller, 2015/16) 
Graph 4: Level of complexity: Project Nissan Leaf (Aller, 2015/16) 
51 
 
Other aspects that add complexity to a project are the difficulties associated with project 
management. Some determinants are the general flexibility, the team size, experience, 
resources and the timeframe. The project team size is moderate adding a bit of complexity, 
but overall the team experience is high then again reducing the complexity. The large 
amount of resources also allows a less strict managerial control. The timeframe is very 
limited since a date for the market entry was set. In terms of flexibility, this case relies on a 
team that consists of some specialist, but with no clear dependence on an individual. With 
a skilled team in place, basic ideas and tasks can be traded and completed by all team 
members. This leads to an overall score of two out of four making it a mediocre source for 
complexity.  
The overall conclusion in Graph 476 on the main contributors to the level of complexity is that 
for project Nissan Leaf, the ambiguity, the technical and the contextual factors were most 
influential. These were the areas that needed the most management control, so that the 
project can be concluded. 
7. Apple iPhone, 2007 
The Apple iPhone project was officially initiated in 2005, where about 200 top engineers 
were tasked with creating this innovative product. Speculations were that Steve Jobs was 
working on an entry strategy in 2004 already, approaching multiple carriers with preliminary 
concepts. By 2006 the prototype was still failing at the demonstration and did not work, 
dropping calls, failing to charge, producing corrupt and unusable data and not playing the 
applications. By early 2007, the Apple product was supposed to be placed as the centrepiece 
of the annual Macworld convention. The stakeholder AT&T had agreed to be the new iPhone 
carrier after 1,5 years of negotiations and agreements on 10% profit shares, and iTunes 
revenue. The design, manufacturing and marketing of the iPhone still rested with Apple. By 
Dec. 2006 the tech team had managed to put together a working prototype with brilliant 
screen, powerful web browser and engaging user interference. By June 29th, 2007 the 
iPhone went on sale and sold in huge quantities.77 
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7.1. Classification 
Despite the preliminary struggles of bringing a functioning device to the public and multiple 
flaws in the initial prototypes, the Apple iPhone can be seen as a successful, ‘Type 1’ project. 
Even though the final product can be considered quite pricy the profit margins for Apple are 
very beneficiary and since the budget was not limited, the cost of the project was within 
bounds. With a timely market entry and the promised high quality, the final results of the 
project can be considered a huge success. 
7.2. Performance 
In order to understand the significance of all performance levels listed in Appendix 3: 
Performance Overview: Project Apple iPhone78 it is easier group them into higher and lower 
percentage groups. Generally, the Apple iPhone project has very strong performance 
percentages; especially significant are the skills and expertise. Specifically, for this project, 
Apple’s 200 top engineers were charged with designing this product. Also peaking in 
performance was the marketing approach of the product, displaying the iPhone prototype 
in Macworld in early 2007, providing potential customers with direct access to the product. 
Additional to this, role management and benefits management also express high 
performance levels. 
Continuing with good performance areas, design can be mentioned. Despite having a faulty 
prototype with multiple issues, the second prototype managed to convince AT&T and the 
final product drew up a huge customer base. The budget for the project was unlimited and 
allowed the performance of tasks to succeed without restraints. Furthermore, resource 
selection and commitment were on high performance levels, despite innovative materials 
and potential new suppliers, the tested materials were ordered and delivered on time and 
in high quality. The executive support can also be named here, with Steve Jobs taking a 
personal interest in this project, controlling the speed and detail associated with the work. 
This was at times overbearing and hindered the engineer’s progress at times.  
Now one needs to take a closer look at the performance areas with low percentages. The 
cost projections fall into this category, since the end product was introduced into the market 
as one of the priciest smartphones, with Apple pulling high profits per unit sold. Another 
lagging performance was through the accountability model, where the engineering team 
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was held responsible for non-controllable situations, and confronted directly. The 
stakeholder management was another half performance, since AT&T had such a high 
interest in the success of the product. The not functional prototype almost lost Apple this 
stakeholder, due to previously set unrealistic expectations. This links into delivery 
management, so even though the final product was on time, the prototypes in between did 
not keep up with the promises made. Job’s expectations also resulted in a stressful and 
unrealistic schedule for completing the project. 
 
While the technical risks were extremely high, it being an R&D project, management risks 
were relatively low, since the development of a new product is a standard process. Graph 579 
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 shows the data projected in a bar diagram. The average performance level lies at 96,88%, 
indicated by the dark line. This determines that the overall performance level was high and 
through the excelling nature of skills and expertise of the team and many standardized tasks, 
the product’s success was very sure, despite high technical risks. Unrealistic scheduling, and 
certain mishaps in delivery, accountability, and stakeholder management and cost 
projections did impact the project and a more extensive analysis would have been amicable.  
7.3. Complexity 
When trying to identify the most vital areas of control, the overall areas of complexity have 
to be analysed. The scores are summarized in Table 480. 
*Extensive version: Appendix 4: Level of complexity: Project Apple iPhone 
The first criteria scored 3 out of 4 and can be considered fairly complex. While the project 
itself does not have that many stakeholder, AT&T does hold quite a lot of power in case of 
failure. The commitment and communication to the stakeholder had to be upheld, to not 
add to the complexity of the project unnecessarily.  
Social factors in this project were very simple. Not only was there no mixing of skills, but also 
the only amount of cross communication was from the executive to the team of engineers, 
with a very straightforward line. Even though management gave the direction of the project, 
they left the engineers to discover the solution. Overall this category only scored a one out 
of four.  
Ambiguity levels are fairly high again, with a three out of four. The main contributors are 
assumptions and uncertainty that R&D would be completed in time. The unrealistic 
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timeframe of the project was eventually followed, but caused high levels of stress and it was 
a high risk that it would be a failure, projected through by the malfunctioning prototypes.  
The complexity of project management is mediocre, despite the large team size, the task 
specific experience the team had helped the process run smoothly and efficiently. The only 
limiting factor was the set timeframe, which was possible to keep since resources and the 
overall flexibility of financial aid, location and expertise were supportive. Here a score of two 
out of four can be determined. 
The final category, technical risk was again rather high, scoring a three out of four, in terms 
of complexity. While the projects dependence on technical infrastructure was limited to 
common programming databases and simple tools the R&D nature showed other results 
for the technical success. For the product and projects success, the technical and material 
knowledge had to be applied properly and in time.  
 
The overall levels of complexity are summarized in Graph 681. This clearly identifies the main 
contributors as technical, contextual and ambiguity. These had to specifically be monitored 
to guarantee the project’s success. 
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8. SNCF, 2014 
For 2014, the French railway company SNCF had ordered about 2000 new trains. The 
problem with this project was that these trains were only fitted to the width of rails built in 
the last 30 years. This issue was not discovered until after the trains were delivered. This 
oversight lead to additional budget expansions for adjusting platforms at a cost of more than 
$68 million with more than 1000 stations still needing adjustment. The official statement is 
that the national rail operator RFF, a partner in this project, provided false measurements 
and due to insufficient communication the project can be considered a failure.82 The 
problem has also been blamed on the engineers that did not double-check the theoretical 
data in the field.83 
8.1. Classification 
The SNCF project can be described as a ‘Type 2’ project, a challenged project. Even though 
this project will eventually be completed, the short-term quality, the overall duration and 
the immense increase in costs are problematic. Due to oversized trains, many stations 
cannot be accessed, some trains cannot pass one another and the quality of the actual 
product is thereby reduced. Due to the lack of communication regarding the width of rails, 
and the resulting changes that have to be undertaken, additional costs and a later 
completion date were the result. 
8.2. Performance 
Appendix 5: Project performance Level: Project SNCF84 gives an overview of the overall 
performance in various influential areas of the project. Due to the complexity of the order 
many aspects were critical. One of these was design, which had to be planned according to 
information received from partners and passed on to the suppliers. In this case the most 
crucial part of communicating the right information failed completely. Not only was the final 
design incompatible with more than 1000 stations, but this faultiness also drove up cost 
projections and made the official date of completion impossible. The delivery of a functional 
system was also not achieved. Management risks were relatively low even though it was a 
large project; the assembly of the trains was external, leaving less responsibility with 
management. Mediocre performance was expressed in resources, the commitment and 
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selection as well as the executive support. Since the trains were just an update of previous 
models, materials and suppliers were the same, just with an improved design. The executive 
support depended mainly on management and experts to complete the work.  
This leads to the high performance areas, which includes the standardized processes such 
as accountability, marketing, benefits and role management. The budget was set and even 
though it was eventually not followed, the extra budget had to be taken since changing the 
train design would have been costlier. The workers were specialists and experts that 
somehow forgot one of the basic tasks costing millions in Euros. 
From the above table the following Graph 785 was created: 
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The darker line indicates the average performance level of the project which in this case lies 
at 65,63%. This is barely mediocre performance and despite the strong areas such as skills 
and expertise, the marketing approach and benefit management, the project cannot be 
named a success. Problems such as a faulty design result in problematic cost projections and 
scheduling issues led to the overall failure of the project. 
8.3. Complexity 
The next step, the analysis of the complexity of the project, is vital to determine the level of 
managerial control necessary. Table 586 summarizes this according to various criteria. 
*Extensive version: Appendix 6: Level of complexity: Project SNCF 
The first one is contextual measures; here a score of three out of four was reached. The high 
number of stakeholders determines that in this case, the SNCF, the railroad company RFF, 
the personnel and users of respective trains, had a direct interest in the success of the 
project. The actual amount of control the stakeholders have over the project is mediocre. 
This makes this category the most important to control.  
Another category that introduces complexity is social factors. Even though there is a 
mediocre amount of communication between sectors, there is still need for sharing data 
and information on the project. The teams are generally not mixed in disciplines. The SNCF 
project scores a two out of four, causing little concern for management.  
Ambiguity in this case plays a very small role, with a low score of one out four; management 
control can be kept to a minimum. The factor that drives this category is the cost estimation, 
which is reflected in a change of budget. The assumption and the uncertainty risk associated 
with this project are barely present, and not an influence factor on the overall complexity of 
the project.  
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The second highest factor in influencing the complexity of the project is project 
management. Scoring a high medium value of 2,5 out of four points, giving management 
some level of concern for closer monitoring and constant control. This value is contributed 
to a low flexibility, since the task and outcome has been fixed and the due date of the project 
is also pre-set. Since the resources and the timeframe are relatively strict, complexity is also 
added to the overall project. 
The last area of potential complexity is the technical risks. Here the project lies at two out 
four points, again at a medium level, not giving a reason for direct concern. The general 
infrastructure of the project depends on technical tools, without being as vital for 
completing the process, since the manufacturing of the train is outsourced. The dependence 
on technology is kept low, minimizing the effect on the overall complexity. 
From this the following graph was drawn up, which shows the data in a spider net diagram. 
From Graph 887 the main contributors to the complexity of the project can be named as 
contextual criteria and the project management area. 
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9. Airbus A380 
This new development and design project, originally scheduled for delivery in 2006 was 
delayed by almost two years and cost several billion dollars over budget. The product design 
included one of the most complex wiring systems at that point in time, due to the extreme 
level of specification, a problem arose when wires turned out to be too short. Eventually the 
discovery was made that collaboration and communication between the 16 engineering 
teams, spread over four different countries, was faulty and different CAD, Computer Aided 
Design software, versions had been used on the designs. Overall this lead to non-compatible 
design versions, which included different calculation methods, configuration management 
failures and varying results. This lead to multiple delays, while the engineering teams tried 
to overcome the caused problems. The impact this relatively simple error had were grave, 
costing the company $6,1 billion due to the project delay.88 
9.1. Classification 
The Airbus A380 project falls into the category of a 'Type 2' projects, a challenged project. 
Despite being completed eventually, both time and cost suffered greatly. Due to the faulty 
communication between the country’s engineer teams, different software was used. Not 
only did this cause major calculation problems, which directly affected the material ordered, 
but also caused multiple further delays just to sort out the problems the team faced. 
9.2. Performance 
From the perceived data Appendix 7: Performance Overview: Project Airbus A38089 was created. 
Throughout the table various performance levels indicate the areas of potential weakness 
that may have been responsible for causing the delay and increased cost of the project. The 
weakest performance areas can be identified as cost projections, scheduling, design and 
delivery. These are all interlinked areas and relied on the success and precision of one 
another. The root cause of the problem is in the design area, where miscalculations by 
different program versions provided false material specifications. Because of this, material 
had to be reordered in the correct sizes, which cost production another two years to fix this 
problem. It also drove up cost projections, the scheduling and the delivery of the final 
product. The lowest risks were in the skills the team possessed and the stakeholder 
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management, which were clear and well developed throughout the project. Due to the size 
of the team, management and executive support as well as role management were 
challenging, with teams from multiple countries working on this project, the communication 
levels had to be at an ultimate high. From this the accountability levels can be determined, 
which are in this case spread over many levels of management, due to a relatively complex 
role management structure with multiple responsibility levels. High performance levels can 
be seen especially in the standardized tasks, such as benefit management and the marketing 
approach.  Additionally, the general management risks, the technical risks had to be 
controlled immensely, since this product was the first of its kind, using highly complex wiring 
systems. 
From the above table the following Graph 990 was created: 
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Graph 9: Project performance: Project Airbus A380 (Aller, 2015/16) 
62 
 
The various levels of performance can be averaged on the darker line, at 71,88%. This 
performance level is slightly better than mediocre, but still indicating an overall 
underperformance of the full potential the project carries. Despite the strongest identified 
factors: skills and experience and stakeholder management, the weaker areas: delivery, 
design, scheduling and cost projections limit the success of the project.  
9.3. Complexity 
As another characterising method of the project, the various levels of complexity have been 
identified; in order to show the areas that require the most attention Table 691 provides an 
overview of the numbers. 
*Extensive data: Appendix 8: Level of Complexity: Project Airbus A380 
The first area of complexity is contextual with a level of two out of four. The number of 
stakeholders is very low and is only represented as the airline that should eventually benefit 
from the success of the project. These results in high control measure the stakeholder has 
over the project. Since they are the sole investor in the project, they have complete financial 
and directional control of the project.  
The social factor area scores at four out four. This is a result of the complex team structure, 
with multi-disciplinary and cross-disciplinary work, which is vital for the completion of the 
product. Included in this thought process is the level of communication between sectors and 
the dependence on management that has to relay information from top management 
throughout all teams in all countries. The teams have to rely on one another to complete 
the tasks in a high quality and perceptive manner.  
Ambiguity is the third sector also ranked at four out of four. The high value is caused by 
problems that occurred during the project. Due to these miscalculations the cost 
estimations and uncertainty around the timeframe especially suffered. The general nature 
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Criteria Airbus A380
Contextual 2
Social facts 4
Ambiguity 4
Project Management 2,5
Technical 4
Table 6: Level of complexity: Project Airbus A380 (Aller, 
2015/16) 
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of an R&D project, with technology that was never attempted before, comes with high risk 
and uncertainty.  
Furthermore, the project management itself can be added to the complexity of a project. 
Here a score of 2,5 of four was reached. The main contributors are the large size of the 
project team, with multiple complex management structures in multiple countries. Also the 
resources, that were highly specialized and were ordered again due to miscalculations, made 
the completion of the production more complex than necessary. The timeframe could not 
be kept, since the tasks were not completed so that the information matched one another. 
Costs and time had to be increased.  
Lastly, the technical complexity of the project will be addressed. The score in this area lies 
at four out of four possible marks. Since the project is an R&D project, and incorporates new, 
complex wiring structures in the product, the project depends highly on the success of the 
application of the technology. Not only is the project itself technical, but also the 
infrastructure itself. Levels of communication and sharing of information between the teams 
is vital for the success of the project. The programs for designing the product are highly 
complex and all calculations and measurements depend on the success of applying the 
technology to the product. 
Graph 10: Level of complexity: Project Airbus A380 (Aller, 2015/16) 
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From the complexity table the spider net graph was drawn. Graph 1092 identifies the main 
contributors to complexity as: social factors, ambiguity, and technical risks. These would 
have required special managerial attention. 
10. Compare ARA to case studies 
 
In order to confirm the preliminary standpoint, it is vital to compare the case study data 
from previous cases. Even though this work only identified two successes and two failures, 
it will provide a general prediction of the outcome of ‘Project ARA’. First the project 
performance will be ranked against the other projects, followed by a comparable view of 
the individual areas of complexity. The final step will include the graphing of the 
performance against the complexity. From this a trend line for the potential success can be 
graphed and compared to ‘Project ARA’.  
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10.1. Preliminary standpoint 
From the collected data the performance of ‘Project ARA’ can be levelled at an average of 
87,5 %. This measure predicts a slight underperformance, with many weak areas such as 
delivery, scheduling stakeholder management and executive support. With this slightly 
lower outcome it is crucial to be controlled by management. If not controlled further, it can 
impact the outcome of the project negatively. The performance percentage is high, making 
it possible to control the outcome by applying constant managerial control.  
This in combination with the risk analysis outlines potential problematic factors. The most 
dominant ones include technical equipment, scheduling and skills and experience. These are 
internal, business and planning risks that will most likely impact the time taken for a project, 
and secondarily the quality and cost of the project. All three are controllable through 
offloading or reducing the amount of work in order to achieve the outcome and results.  
The third point that flows into hypothesizing the type of project is the complexity. For 
‘Project ARA’ this complexity is extremely high with a score of 15,5 out of 20. The project 
outlines extreme values in both technical and social factors, both scoring the highest level 
possible. This requires management enforce high monitoring methods, in order to deal with 
these potential risk factors that can cause a project to fail.  
Overall this leaves one to conclude that ‘Project ARA’ lies between becoming a ‘Type 1’ and 
‘Type 2’, either predicting a successful or challenged outcome. If managerial control is high 
enough and complexity levels are reduced, the risk factors are taken into consideration and 
the performance levels are raised, then the project has the potential to be successful. If 
these suggestions are not applied, the project will most probably become a 'type 2' project. 
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10.2. Performance monitoring 
Graph 1193 compares average performance levels of the analysed case studies and ‘Project 
ARA’. The successful projects: Nissan Leaf and Apple iPhone have high values between 90 to 
100%, while the failures range between 65 and 75%. As the graph indicates ‘Project ARA’ 
lies in between the two levels. Since the amount of data we have limits the accuracy of the 
results, general assumptions have to be made. In this case it can be said that ‘Project ARA’ 
is in a grey zone, with its average performance level of 87%, it is closer to the average 
performance levels of successful projects with only 3% off. 
The conclusive information from the performance data solely, would rank ‘Project ARA’ as a 
‘Type 1’ project, a success, even if this is not as certain as for the previously studied cases. 
This result can only occur if the performance levels are increased from what they currently 
are and the performance of all tasks are monitored and a constant feedback loop is upheld. 
 
Since the average performance has so many criteria, it is important to identify the specific 
contribution factors and identify any overlap. ‘Project ARA’ is graphed against the two 
successful and then the two failed case studies. From there the key drivers for failure and 
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for success will be identified. Depending on how dominant the overlap is, the more precise 
the determination of governance factors will be.  
Graph 1294 provides an overview of the weakest performance categories and might give 
indications of the factors that caused the overall failure of the projects. 
*more detailed information Appendix 11: Performance Projections: failed projects 
Low performance factors, both case studies share are: design, scheduling and cost 
projections, not exceeding a 25% mark. Since ARA does not match any of those criteria and 
lays at least one bar above those criteria, in some cases such as with design even 
recognizably higher, these can be flagged as criteria that need to be monitored. 
In addition, criteria that are equally high are executive support at 50% and resource 
commitment at 75%. Again ARA exceeds these low performances by at least 25% and comes 
into full performance levels. Despite a lower performance in executive support, the amount 
of managerial control regular check-ins will be sufficient for managing these areas.  
                                                          
94 (Aller, 2015/16) 
Graph 12: Project Performance comparison: failed project to 'Project ARA' (Aller, 2015/16) 
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Criteria where ‘Project ARA’ levels with one of the failed projects are delivery, with 50% 
performance levelled with SNCF and resource selection at 75% with airbus A380. Both 
criteria are probably the most important in this analysis, since they indicate that this 
performance levels in that these specific criteria were partially cause for the project failure. 
These are areas that need close monitoring so that they do not impact ‘ARA’ negatively.  
When ranking the successful projects against each other, many similarities can be identified 
in Graph 1395, which could be indicators for key success drivers. The performance levels that 
both case studies rank the same, are stakeholder management, budgeting, resource 
commitment and role management. When regarding ‘Project ARA’ in comparison, a level of 
75% performance can be seen for stakeholder management, matching the performance of 
the successful projects. Additionally, the resource commitment ranks at 100%, between the 
three projects, as well as budgeting at 125%. Since these are at the same level the required 
managerial control will be very low. 
*more detailed information: Appendix 12: Performance projections successful projects 
The criteria in which ‘Project ARA’ ranks considerably lower than the two successes are role 
management, which is due to the team size of ‘Project ARA’. The percentages of the 
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successful projects lie at 125% with standardized processes, against a meagre 50% ARA 
promises. This leads to a conclusive behaviour of extremely high attention from 
management, to implement a precise reporting structure, so that no information shortages 
occur.  
The third group is indicated through areas in which ARA scores the same as one of the 
projects. This is true for the criteria: benefits management, skills and expertise, resource 
selection and technical risks.  The matching levels of performance indicate that these levels 
of performance have been high enough to guarantee a successful project. Therefore, 
managerial control can be periodically. 
10.3. Complexity comparison 
The complexity comparison provides further insight into the nature of the projects, and 
state, which require specific managerial control. The higher the complexity, the harder it is 
for management to control the outcome of the project. From this it can be concluded that 
the higher the complexity the less likely the success of the project. 
 
Graph 14: Complexity level comparison – total score (Aller, 2015/16) 
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Graph 1496 shows the complexity per project and ranks them against each other. Both 
success stories have a mediocre level of complexity ranking at 12 out of 20 potential points. 
The non-successful projects show either an extremely high level of complexity such as Airbus 
A380 with a level of 16,5 out of 20 points, or a low complexity in the SNCF project with only 
10,5. The high level of complexity in the airbus A380 project can be cause for its failure. SNCF 
despite having a very low level complexity still turned out to be a failure. From this a general 
statement can be given that the level of complexity to some extent does not guarantee the 
success or failure of a project, but rather how management handles the performance levels 
and risks.  
When comparing the values from ‘Project ARA’ to this, its complexity is at 15,5 points out of 
20. This is a high level of complexity and lies closest to the failed project Airbus A380. On the 
other hand, the other failed project has a much lower complexity level. For the purpose of 
determining the potential success or failure of ‘ARA’, the general concept is that high 
complexity will most likely result in the failure of the project. This would then mean that, 
considering the data, ‘Project ARA’ has such a high complexity, that the likelihood of it being 
a failure is very high. This would predict ‘ARA’ as a ‘Type 2’ project. Overall it would fall into 
the category of a challenged project, where the negative impact is reflected in the time, 
quality or cost of the project. 
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Going into further detail, Graph 1597 provides an overview of the various projects divided 
into the five complexity categories: contextual, social factors, ambiguity, project 
management and technical complexity. 
 
When evaluating ‘Project ARA’ against the given factors from successful and failed projects, 
the main concern will be to find the overlap to the successes stories and the failed projects. 
This will be done by category. In terms of contextual complexity, ‘Project ARA’ matches with 
both successful projects and with the failed project SNCF at a complexity of three. This is the 
only category where the complexity matches. ARA is decisively more complex than the 
successful projects in three categories: social factors, project management and technical 
complexity, where it rather matches the failed projects. The fifth criteria, ambiguity is 
actually much lower than that of the successful projects, again reducing the overall failure 
of the project. Overall this indicates that only two out of the five complexity characteristics 
predict a successful project. 
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10.4. Graphical comparison 
When graphing the collected values, Graph 1698 shows the results. 
 
When paying attention to the successful projects, the coordinates lie closely together, and 
nearly match the trend line. They have almost 100% in performance levels and a mediocre 
complexity score. When assessing the failed projects one notices that their performance 
levels are much lower falling below 75%. Their complexities differ widely and cannot be 
compared. While Airbus A380 lies far above the trend line, SNCF lies far below it. This general 
trend indicates that the lower the project performance, the less likely the project is to 
succeed. In terms of complexity, a lower complexity is generally better, but mixed with low 
performance levels, even the lowest complexity level can cause a project to fail. 
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Graph 16: Project execution capability comparison (Aller, 2015/16) 
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 From this the three statements can be produced:  
 High performance level (75% +) is most probable to lead to success  
 Low complexity (12 and lower) generally indicates success 
 If performance levels are below 75%, even low complexity levels will cause the 
project to fail.  
Additionally, the calculated trend line will give an indication of the complexity level by 
performance level, which will allow a success in the project.  
y = -2,8657x + 15,09 
The accuracy of this trend line is very low with an r² =0,0282. This value normally ranges 
between 0 and 1, whereas any value above 0,85 indicates that the linear equation 
represents the data in a statically significant and correct way. This inaccuracy is partially due 
to the lack of overall data and that there are only four sets of data. With more readings the 
line and r² would become more precise and outliers in the typical data could be recognized. 
11. Conclusion 
In conclusion the previously collected data be summarizes to provide a complete overview 
of the results. According to these results the preliminary standpoint will be adjusted. 
Furthermore, the effects of the result on the project overall will be listed and potential 
governance factors will be suggested. 
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11.1. Summary of data 
When assessing ‘Project ARA’ through Graph 16 and the previous analysis the following can 
be collected:  
1. In terms of performance levels, ‘Project ARA’ is very likely to succeed (Type 1) 
2. In terms of complexity levels, ‘Project ARA’ is likely to fail (Type 2) 
Just assessing the performance levels, 'Project ARA’ with its 87% average performance, 
resembles the successful projects. Specific traits that are shared as key success drivers are 
benefits management, skills and expertise, resource selection and technical risks. Factors 
that speak against the success of the ‘ARA’ are delivery and resource selection.  
Continuing on to the complexity levels, ‘Project ARA’ scores 15,5 points out of 20. This high 
level of complexity lays closest to a failed project. When assessing the individual complexity 
criteria, ‘ARA’ is decisively more complex than the successful projects. This is especially true 
for the three categories: social factors, project management and technical complexity, 
where it rather matches the failed projects. Speaking against its failure, in terms of 
complexity is only the criteria ambiguity, where its complexity is much lower than any other 
project.  
Now in order to assess this through the graphed values it become clear that ‘Project ARA’ 
does not follow the trend line. But from the previously set rules, it can be predicted that 
‘Project ARA’ will indeed become a ‘Type 2’ project. Despite the fact that performance levels 
are slightly higher than those of the failed projects, this performance level will most likely 
not be enough to cope with the high complexity of the project. 
11.2. Revised standpoint  
When comparing this with the initial stand point, where one would suggest project’s out-
come to lie between ‘Type 1’ and ‘Type 2’, but with a higher tendency of becoming a ‘Type 
2’ project, the results from a comparison to the case studies shows similar results. The 
results however provide a confirmation that ‘Project ARA’ will indeed become a ‘Type 2’ 
project. This statement is founded in the level of complexity, despite the tendency to 
succeed when only viewing the performance levels. 
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11.3. Effect on project  
The overall effect on the project will be a reduction in final product quality, an extended 
timeframe or a raise in the projected costs. Since the project has not been concluded yet 
the potential governance factors can tip the scale towards a success or challenging project.   
11.4. Identification of governance factors 
After the results have been collected, it was identified that ‘Project ARA’ is most likely to 
become a 'Type 2' project.  Since this falls into the category of challenged projects, either 
the quality, cost or time will be impacted. In order to minimize the negative impact and 
maybe even improve the project from a ‘Type 2’ to a ‘Type 1’, governance factors have to 
be applied to the areas that are the most problematic.  
Taking Figure 14 on page 30 into consideration, the first governing group is the internal audit, 
which focuses on the key risks. As identified these include the planning risk of task scheduling 
and the Internal risks effective scheduling and technical equipment, as well as the business 
risks with the skill level of the workers.  Similar to the approach when previously assessing 
the risk, the internal audit will have to come up with solutions to reduce, offload or accept 
the consequences of these risks. The financial risks controlled through the external audit lie 
in the space availability and the potential extra fees or taxes linked in a more dominant 
support of local businesses. Both committees will have to present their findings to the audit 
committee. A clear picture has to be created, so that management can apply governance 
factors and controlling methods. 
Senior management, that are responsible for the daily supervision, planning and 
administrative process to reach company goals, will have to especially focus on the high 
social factors and the high technical complexity. Both factors are potential problematic areas 
that could contribute to the failure of ‘Project ARA’. This is reflected in the performance 
monitoring through factors such as role management, which has a weak performance. 
Furthermore, performance levels have to be improved for the delivery, the scheduling and 
the cost projections. If these regions are improved, the project will have a good chance of 
not failing and slipping to 'Type 1' identification.  
The board of directors that receives the feedback from the senior management will then 
have to take all of the provided data into account and manage its goals accordingly. This will 
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then have to be reported to the stakeholders of the project that in this case have a slightly 
underperforming standpoint and could be included more in the project.  
Since the project is also controlled through government laws and taxes, as well as the 
program governance itself, it is vital that communication levels are kept high and data on 
the newest successes or even failures is shared. If these suggestions are taken into 
consideration the negative impact on quality, time and cost can be minimized. 
12. Summary 
12.1. Process to develop method 
The thought process that went into developing a method to determine the success or 
failure of project is based on simple project management processes. The inclusion of 
classification, risk analysis, performance and complexity levels and the final comparison to 
previous case studies was an essential part of this process. Through the application of this 
model, and a slight revision of the methods presented through Deloitte, into an own 
interpretation of the data, allowed the creation of a model. While keeping the constraint 
triangle in mind, time, quality and cost, the data was analysed, only to conclude in a 
prediction with the addition of potential governing factors. 
12.2. Limitations and weaknesses 
The adaptation of Deloitte’s method, with addition of extra steps in the model for 
determining the success of a project can be counted as a success. Not only did it aid in 
prediction a logical outcome for ‘Project ARA’, but it also allowed insights into key driving 
factors for the success or failure of projects.  
Potential weaknesses of this method were, that the final graphical comparison between the 
projects only used four case studies as comparative data, limiting the value of a trend line. 
Furthermore, in this project only ‘Type 1’ and ‘Type 2’ projects were analysed, which was 
mainly due to the fact that ‘Type 3’ projects are buried by the company and data is 
inaccessible. If this method were to be applied within a company, the model would benefit 
from the inclusion of more sets of data. 
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n Airbus A380 Comments
Technical Risks 100,00%
The technical risk is extremely high, since this product will be first to apply 
complex wiring of ist kind. The likelihood that something will go wrong is 
very large.
Management Risks 100,00%
Management had to be point to control the high risk that comes with such 
a large team spread over multiple countries all designing this comple 
product. 
Skills and Experience 125,00%
All team members are highly skilled and experts in their field,  with a lot of 
experience on similar topics. 
Resource Selection 75,00%
Since the resources are all specialized, the selection is very dependant on 
calculations of the design, which were in this case flawed.
Resource Commitment 75,00%
Since material had to be ordered twice, due to miscalcuations the 
resources for production were delayed. 
Executive Support 50,00%
The executive support was limited by the fact that a lot of information got 
lost through the management levels, and communication was only to the 
next superior. 
Role Management 75,00%
The reporting hierarchy was specialized, it was overly complex since the 
time size and responsibility was spread over multiple countries. 
Budgets 75,00% The budget for the airplane was set, but could be enlarge if necessary. 
Cost Projections 25,00%
The project overshot the budget, since the miscalculations led to repeated 
material orders, with a delay in production
Benefits Management 100,00%
The benefits are standardized, and dependant on the individual 
engagement issued in the form of boni.
Accountability Model 75,00%
The accountability is attributed over a larger target group, due to the large 
team size.
Stakeholder Management 100,00%
The decriptors of the end product was clear and the communication to 
stakeholders was on point, the problems were caused through internal 
communication. 
Scheduling 25,00%
Due to miscalculations and the adjustment of material and production, the 
schedule was not on point, and compeltiong two years too late. 
Design 25,00%
The design calculations were faulty, due to non compatible programs that 
applied different formulas. 
Delivery 25,00% The delivery of the product was delayed due to the faulty desing. 
Marketing approach 100,00% The marketing approach followed standard procedure. 
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Criteria Criteria defined
highest 
possible score 
Airbus A380
4 2
# of stakeholders high number - high complexity
2,00 0
Power of stakeholders
independence from 
stakeholder (opinion, financial, 
control) 2,00 2
4 4
Multi-disciplinary 
amount of communication 
between sectors, how 
dependant on mgmt 2,00 2
Cross disciplinary 
mixed skilled teams, sector 
work 2,00 2
4 4
Cost Estimation change in budget 1,00 1
Assumptions & 
Uncertainty 
change in timeframe, quality, 
unrealistic 
2,00 2
Risk 
especially R&D projects, higher 
likelihood to flop 1,00 1
Technical 4 4
Integration complexity
level of dependence (project 
itself) 2,00 2
Impact on infrastructure 
tools (database, entirely 
technical) 2,00 2
4 2,5
Flexibility 
dependence on location, 
individual's expertise, 
financial, if high, then 
complexity is high 1,00 0
Project Team size the larger the more complex 
1,00 1
Project Team experience
high qualifications = low 
complexity 0,50 0
Resources unlimited = low complexity 0,50 0,5
Timeframe not bound = low complexity 
1,00 1
Contextual 
Social facts 
Ambiguity 
Project Management
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